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   I. Introduction 
Dividend policy is a key topic in the mainstream finance literature. A hitherto undisputed finding is 
that publicly listed firms tend to smooth dividends to avoid dividend cuts (Lintner (1956)).1 Recent 
contributions investigate the determinants of dividend smoothing both in the U.S. (Leary and Michaely 
(2011)) and globally (Javakhadze, Ferris and Sen (2014)).  
A possible reason for dividend smoothing is provided by signalling theory: dividend changes convey 
information to the market on the value of the firm.2 Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) are the first to 
specifically study the timing of dividend announcements and its informational content. Damodaran 
(1989) investigates day-of-the-week effects in dividend announcement dates.  Hull (2013, 2015) 
studies the timing of dividend cuts in relation to the business cycle. Further research on this topic is, 
however, rather sparse.  
In this paper, I investigate the timing preferences for dividend announcement dates using a large 
dataset of U.S. firms from the CRSP database from 1971 to 2014. In particular, I address the following 
research question: Can the timing of dividend announcements predict cuts in dividend per share 
(DPS)?   
The relationship between the timing of dividend announcements and dividend cuts has already been 
addressed by the literature: Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) show that dividend cuts occur more often 
when dividend announcements are “late”. However, Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) focus on a very 
short time period (1978-1980), and base their analysis on a definition of “late” dividend announcement 
which is somewhat “arbitrary”, that is, by means of “manual inspection of the pattern of past dividend 
announcement dates” (Kalay and Loewenstein (1986), p. 376). Moreover, while the literature has 
                                                             
1  Michaely and Roberts (2006) provide evidence that for private firms dividend smoothing is less pronounced. 
2 Seminal studies from the  end of the sixties until the mid-eighties examine the informational content of dividend changes by investigating the 
nexus between dividend changes and stock returns: dividend increases (decreases) tend to be associated with stock price movements in the 
same direction (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Pettit (1972) and (1976), Charest (1978), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and 
Mullins (1983), and Brickley (1983)). 
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recently investigated the determinants of dividend smoothing both in the U.S. (Leary and Michaely 
(2011)) and globally (Javakhadze, Ferris and Sen (2014)), there is currently no empirical study that 
investigates predictability in dividend changes based on the timing of dividend announcements. 
I provide evidence that extends the findings provided by Kalay and Loewenstein (1986). Kalay and 
Loewenstein (1986) find that “late” dividend announcements increase the probability of a dividend 
cut. This finding is ascribed to the fact that bad news (a dividend cut) tend to be delayed by firms. My 
findings corroborate Kalay and Loewenstein (1986): the number of calendar (or trading) days between 
two consecutive announcements is associated with an increase in the probability of a dividend cut. The 
probability of a dividend increase, on the other hand, is uncorrelated with the timing of the dividend 
announcement. I also provide some evidence that dividend increases are associated with “early” 
dividend announcements. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the data set and reports the main 
features of the sample. Section III investigates potential determinants of dividend changes, borrowing 
from the literature on the propensity to pay dividends and dividend smoothing. Finally, section IV 
concludes. 
II. Sample selection and methodology 
The data set of quarterly dividend announcements dates in CRSP is available for the period starting 
from 1
st
 January 1962. I consider firms whose primary exchange is the NYSE, AMEX (now NYSE 
MKT), or NASDAQ. Data is collected from the CRSP monthly file for share codes 10 or 11 related to 
ordinary dividends adjusted for splits and stock dividends (CRSP distribution code 1232). Therefore, I 
exclude ADRs, shares of Beneficial Interest, units or Limited Partnerships, foreign incorporated firms, 
closed-end funds, and REITs, consistent with recent literature (Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2014)). I also 
exclude financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900–4949), for 
comparability with previous literature on dividend policy (among others, Fama and French (2001) and 
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DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006)). Because I am interested in dividend announcement dates, 
rather than the propensity to pay dividends, all firms in the sample are dividend payers, although there 
may be periods for which dividend distributions are interrupted for a number of years. 
My baseline regressions are based on Probit models: 
Dit = f(Xit, C it)         (1) 
where Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is: 
1. A DPS increase in quarter t relative to the previous quarter and 0 otherwise; 
2. A DPS decrease in quarter t relative to the previous quarter and 0 otherwise. 
I examine dividend increases and dividend decreases separately because “early” or “late” 
announcements are expected to increase the probability of a dividend cut, but not the probability of a 
dividend increase (Kalay and Loewenstein (1986)). I use the nominal DPS, rather than real DPS, as in 
previous literature on dividend announcements (for example, Aharony and Swary (1980); Kalay and 
Loewenstein (1986)). 
The main variable of interest, Xit, is the number of calendar days between two consecutive 
declaration dates (for quarter t – 1 and quarter t) for the same firm.3 For firms that do not omit 
dividends, the number of calendar days between two consecutive announcements should be around 
90.4  
The control variables, represented by the vector Cit, are borrowed from the literature on dividend 
smoothing and the propensity to pay dividends. Fama and French (2001) provide evidence that firms 
that are bigger, more profitable and with lower investment opportunities tend to pay dividends. 
                                                             
3 The number of calendar days between two announcements can be longer than a quarter for periods of disruption in dividend payments. For 
example, if the company missed an announcement, this would result in around 180 calendar days between the two announcements. However, 
as reported in the notes to the table, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The first percentile is 44 and the 99th percentile 
is 182 calendar days. To understand whether dividend omissions have any impact on my estimates, I run robustness checks considering only 
cases for which there is no disruption, that is, cases where the announcements happen in two consecutive quarters. The results remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively unaltered and are available upon request. 
4  As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the number of days before an announcement cannot be determined before the announcement date, 
when the amount of the DPS becomes known. Therefore, it can be argued that Xit is not exactly a predictor of dividend changes. However, in 
case of announcements that occur after the usual announcement date, investors can use the informational content of a delayed announcement 
before they actually know the amount of the dividend. For example, if an announcement should occur around 90 days after the last one, and for 
the current quarter an announcement has yet to be released 100 days after the previous one, investors can use this piece of information to 
predict the amount of the dividend for the current quarter. In particular, the findings of this paper suggest that, if the announcement date occurs 
later than expected, the probability of a dividend cut is higher. 
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DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) introduce the stage of the life cycle of a firm as a key factor 
for the decision to pay dividends. Recent literature points out that dividend smoothing (the tendency to 
avoid changes in the DPS) can be affected by information asymmetries.5 Such information 
asymmetries are lower for firms that are bigger, older, with a high degree of asset tangibility and 
investment opportunities (Leary and Michaely (2011)). In light of this literature, the vector Cit consists 
of the following variables:6 Firm age (the number of years since the firm first appeared in the 
COMPUSTAT database); Profitability, proxied by the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) to total assets; size, as proxied by the market value of assets 
(Market cap) and the book value of assets (Total assets);7 asset tangibility, proxied by the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets (Tangibility); the market-to-book ratio (MA/BA), which 
proxies for investment opportunities; the standard deviation of Profitability (Earnings volatility) and 
the Beta, which proxy for risk; and the Speed of Adjustment (SOA).8 
For all regressions standard errors are clustered on the firm level and robust to heteroscedasticity, 
and year fixed effects are included. Data availability for the control variables requires the sample 
period to be from 1971 onwards. Because data for the beta is available from 1993 onwards, the results 
for the regressions where Beta is included consider the sample period 1993-2014. 
 
III. Results  
In Table 1, Panel A, I report the results for Probit regressions where the dependent variables are the 
dummy variables “Dividend increase” and “Dividend decrease”, as described in the previous section. 
In Panel B I report the values of the median, 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of all explanatory variables. The 
                                                             
5 Information asymmetries can be decreased by paying dividends, because they signal to the market of the value of the firm (Bhattacharya (1979); 
John and Williams (1985); Miller and Rock (1985)).  
6 The related items from the COMPUSTAT database are as follows (Leary and Michaely (2011)): Book value of equity (BA) is equal to Total 
assets (item #6) minus book liabilities (#181) minus preferred stock (#10, or #56 if 10# is missing, and  #130 if both #10 and #56 is missing) 
plus deferred taxes (#35). Asset tangibility is the ratio of property plant and equipment (#8) and Total assets. The market value of equity 
(Market value) is the product of #24 and #25. Retained earnings, used to compute (RE/TE and RE/TA) is the item #259. MA/BA is computed as: 
(Market value + Total assets – BA)/Total Assets.Operating income before depreciation is item #13, often referred to as EBITDA. Finally, as 
said above, Firm age is the number of years since the firm first appeared in the COMPUSTAT database. To allow for the long sample period, 
Earnings volatility is computed on an annual basis. 
7 In multivariate regressions, consistent with previous literature, I employ the natural log of Market value and Total assets as a proxy for size. 
8 The SOA is calculated on the basis of equation (3) in Leary and Michaely (2011). 
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median for Days is 91 calendar days, while the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile is 84 and 98 calendar days, 
respectively. 
In all cases, Days does not correlate significantly with “Dividend increase”, but increases the 
probability of a dividend cut. In particular, considering the results in the third column of Table 1, the 
marginal effect of Days on the probability of cutting dividends when Days is equal to its sample 
median (91 days) is 0.0003, suggesting that one standard deviation increase in Days (around 20 
calendar days) increases the probability of a dividend decrease by 0.6 percentage points. Since the 
mean for “Dividend decrease” is 0.0208, this change is hardly negligible (almost 30% of the mean). 
The marginal effect of Days remains virtually the same for column 5 of Table 1. For columns 7 and 9 
the marginal effect is 0.0002. 
An examination of the control variables shows that dividend cuts are more likely for firms that are, 
ceteris paribus, older, less profitable, smaller, with more tangible assets, better growth opportunities, 
and with higher earnings volatility.  
The variation in “Days” can be picking up the variation in number of days-off and holidays, if 
“Days” is the number of calendar days between announcement dates. To further improve the 
robustness of my results, I consider the number of trading days between two consecutive 
announcements. To define trading days, I consider the business calendar for the S&P500 index. 
Moreover, as explained in footnote 3, the number of calendar (or trading) days between two 
announcements can be longer than usual for periods with dividends omissions. Table 2 reports the 
results for the same regressions as for Table 1, but “Days” is in this case the number of trading days 
between two consecutive dividend announcements, rather than calendar days. Cases for which there is 
a disruption in dividend payments are excluded. The median of “Days” is 67 trading days, and the 25th 
and 75
th
 percentile are 63 and 72 trading days, respectively. The results remain virtually the same as 
for Table 1, in terms of both statistical and economic significance. 
I perform further robustness test to assess the sensitivity of my results to changes in the definition of 
my dependent variables or the regressors. Table 3 reports the results for regressions similar to those 
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employed for Table 2, but the dependent variable becomes one only if the change in DPS (positive or 
negative) is larger than 3%. Moreover, I add the variable “Share repurchases”, to assess the potential 
impact of share repurchases on dividend changes. The results for the main variable of interest, “Days”, 
remain substantially unaltered. The coefficient on share repurchases is statistically insignificant or 
weakly significant.9 
Finally, it can be argued using the number of (calendar or trading) days between two consecutive 
dividend announcements (for example, Q4-2006 and Q1-2007) can lead to noise in the data if firms 
tend to have a target gap period between announcement dates. If a firm delays by N days the 
announcement for the current quarter, this automatically reduces the number of days before the 
announcement for the next quarter. This is represented graphically in Figure 1. 
To avoid this problem, I exploit the fact that firms tend to choose the current dividend announcement 
date on the basis of the dividend announcement date for the same quarter of the previous year (for 
example, for Q4-2006 and Q4-2007). Therefore, in a further robustness check, rather than the number 
of trading days between announcement dates, “Days” is the difference between: 
- The actual number of trading days between dividend announcement dates for the same quarter of 
two consecutive years, and  
- The number of trading days in a calendar year. For the U.S., the expected number of trading days 
would be 252. 
For cases where there are late announcements, this variable is positive, while for cases with early 
announcements this variable is negative. The results are reported in Table 4. Similar to the results 
reported in Table 3, the dependent variable is the probability of an increase/decrease in the DPS by 3% 
and I also consider the level of share repurchases as independent variable. The results for dividend cuts 
remain virtually unaltered. The results on dividend increases, unlike for other specifications, suggest 
                                                             
9  In untabulated tests I also exclude observations for which there are share repurchases concomitant with dividend changes. The results remain 
virtually unaltered. However, when I consider only observations for which there are share repurchases concomitant with dividend changes, the 
coefficients on “Days” become insignificant at the 5% level. 
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that positive news tend to be released early. The magnitude of the marginal effects of “Days” on 
“Dividend increase” are around 2.5-4 times larger than the marginal effects of “Days” on “Dividend 
decrease”. 10 
 IV. Conclusions 
This paper examines predictability in dividend cuts for a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 
1971-2014. I provide evidence that delaying the dividend announcement is associated with dividend 
cuts, while dividend increases tend be announced early, suggesting that managers delay the release of 
bad news. 
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Table 1. Number of calendar days between dividend announcements and changes in dividends.  
The sample includes NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11 and distribution code 1232. I exclude 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). “Days” is the number of trading days between two 
consecutive dividend announcement dates for a certain firm. “Dividend increase” and “Dividend decrease” are dummy variables equal to  
one if the dividend per share in a certain quarter for a certain firm is larger than, or smaller than, the dividend per share in the previous 
quarter, respectively. “Marg. effects” is the marginal effect for the variable “Days”, where “Days” is set equal to its median. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Constant not reported but estimated for all regressions. Robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
Panel A 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 
 Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
         
Days  0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 
 (0.950) (8.588) (0.989) (8.534) (0.138) (3.752) (0.163) (3.704) 
Marg. effects 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 
         
Firm age -0.001** 0.003** -0.002*** 0.003** -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.003* 
 (-2.217) (1.996) (-3.067) (2.543) (-0.312) (1.544) (-0.786) (1.887) 
Profitability  7.065*** -4.868*** 6.854*** -4.558*** 5.303*** -1.215 5.139*** -1.037 
 (13.364) (-5.555) (13.079) (-5.287) (6.088) (-0.864) (5.946) (-0.755) 
Total Assets(ln) 0.052*** -0.067***   0.072*** -0.061***   
 (7.396) (-4.069)   (7.065) (-2.711)   
Market cap(ln)   0.066*** -0.088***   0.088*** -0.082*** 
   (9.601) (-5.425)   (8.633) (-3.638) 
Tangibility -0.168*** 0.278*** -0.190*** 0.312*** -0.059 0.244* -0.081 0.277* 
 (-2.981) (3.271) (-3.373) (3.620) (-0.762) (1.646) (-1.042) (1.849) 
MA/BA 0.090*** 0.060** 0.049*** 0.120*** 0.081*** 0.011 0.033 0.060 
 (5.924) (2.165) (3.110) (4.437) (3.423) (0.278) (1.363) (1.574) 
Earnings volatility -5.850*** 5.632*** -5.414*** 5.172*** -3.176* 7.559*** -2.693* 7.026** 
 (-6.219) (3.662) (-5.775) (3.334) (-1.935) (2.761) (-1.673) (2.498) 
SOA -0.001 0.315 0.020 0.289 0.100 0.688 0.121 0.670 
 (-0.010) (1.232) (0.196) (1.100) (0.557) (1.407) (0.682) (1.325) 
Beta     -0.103*** 0.045 -0.109*** 0.057 
     (-3.245) (0.856) (-3.397) (1.086) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Firms 1,577 1,576 1,577 1,576 781 780 781 780 
Observations 72,438 72,385 72,438 72,385 23,757 23,596 23,757 23,596 
 
Panel B Days Firm age Profitability 
Total 
assets(ln) 
Market 
cap(ln) 
Tangibility MA/BA 
Earnings 
volatility 
SOA Beta 
        
  
 p25 84 10 0.0274 4.9292 4.5506 0.1905 0.9804 0.0041 0.0492 0.5335 
Median 91 19 0.0403 6.2065 5.9971 0.3011 1.2466 0.0073 0.1097 0.8748 
p75 98 33 0.0560 7.6054 7.4701 0.4578 1.7333 0.0130 0.1871 1.2584 
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Table 2. Number of trading days between dividend announcements and changes in dividends. 
The sample includes NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11 and distribution code 1232. I exclude 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). “Days” is the number of calendar days between two 
consecutive dividend announcement dates for a certain firm. “Dividend increase” and “Dividend decrease” are dummy variables equal to 
one if the dividend per share in a certain quarter for a certain firm is larger than, or smaller than, the dividend per share in the previous 
quarter, respectively. “Marg. effects” is the marginal effect for the variable “Days”, where “Days” is set equal to its median. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Constant not reported but estimated for all regressions. Robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
Panel A 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 
 Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
Dividend 
increase 
Dividend 
decrease 
         
Days  0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.008*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** 
 (0.681) (8.964) (0.723) (8.910) (-0.153) (4.872) (-0.137) (4.823) 
Marg. effects 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0002 0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0004*** 
         
Firm age -0.001* 0.002 -0.002** 0.003** 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (-1.696) (1.575) (-2.523) (2.067) (0.229) (1.146) (-0.201) (1.448) 
Profitability  7.186*** -5.147*** 6.991*** -4.831*** 5.413*** -2.103 5.261*** -1.910 
 (12.977) (-5.678) (12.727) (-5.414) (5.823) (-1.334) (5.710) (-1.241) 
Total Assets(ln) 0.048*** -0.067***   0.071*** -0.062**   
 (6.547) (-3.758)   (6.524) (-2.565)   
Market cap(ln)   0.064*** -0.088***   0.088*** -0.084*** 
   (8.682) (-5.072)   (7.994) (-3.512) 
Tangibility -0.174*** 0.284*** -0.198*** 0.320*** -0.048 0.300* -0.072 0.336** 
 (-2.965) (3.185) (-3.366) (3.549) (-0.606) (1.906) (-0.914) (2.123) 
MA/BA 0.090*** 0.059** 0.051*** 0.120*** 0.088*** 0.025 0.041 0.076* 
 (5.621) (2.006) (3.033) (4.253) (3.487) (0.615) (1.554) (1.959) 
Earnings volatility -5.989*** 5.197*** -5.553*** 4.738*** -3.592** 5.422** -3.094* 4.834* 
 (-6.046) (3.480) (-5.643) (3.161) (-2.111) (2.152) (-1.859) (1.878) 
SOA -0.025 0.364 -0.004 0.338 0.082 0.767 0.103 0.753 
 (-0.229) (1.311) (-0.035) (1.186) (0.439) (1.416) (0.563) (1.345) 
Beta     -0.103*** 0.040 -0.108*** 0.053 
     (-3.049) (0.696) (-3.194) (0.926) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Firms 1,571 1,570 1,571 1,570 769 765 769 765 
Observations 65,924 65,878 65,924 65,878 21,452 21,146 21,452 21,146 
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Table 3. Number of trading days between dividend announcements and changes in dividends: 
changes in DPS larger than 3%. 
The sample includes NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11 and distribution code 1232. I exclude 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). “Days” is the number of calendar days between two 
consecutive dividend announcement dates for a certain firm. “Dividend increase” and “Dividend decrease” are dummy variables equal to 
one if there is an increase or decrease by at least 3% in the DPS in a certain quarter for a certain firm. “Marg. effects” is the marginal 
effect for the variable “Days”, where “Days” is set equal to its median. “Share repurchases” is the level of share repurchases. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Constant not reported but estimated for all regressions. Robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 
 Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
         
Days  0.000 0.009*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.000 0.008*** 
 (0.456) (8.770) (0.487) (8.709) (0.056) (4.406) (0.064) (4.338) 
Marg. Effects 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 
         
Firm age -0.001** 0.004** -0.002*** 0.005*** -0.000 0.004** -0.001 0.005** 
 (-1.967) (2.367) (-2.800) (2.947) (-0.299) (2.138) (-0.735) (2.452) 
Profitability  7.418*** -6.004*** 7.230*** -5.704*** 5.589*** -1.680 5.461*** -1.479 
 (13.433) (-5.374) (13.212) (-5.178) (6.285) (-1.007) (6.208) (-0.909) 
Total Assets(ln) 0.047*** -0.065***   0.067*** -0.062**   
 (6.415) (-3.000)   (6.095) (-2.066)   
Market cap(ln)   0.063*** -0.094***   0.085*** -0.092*** 
   (8.637) (-4.537)   (7.707) (-3.123) 
Tangibility -0.191*** 0.341*** -0.216*** 0.393*** -0.011 0.315* -0.036 0.360** 
 (-3.463) (3.362) (-3.900) (3.818) (-0.131) (1.899) (-0.442) (2.149) 
MA/BA 0.080*** 0.004 0.041*** 0.074** 0.085*** -0.010 0.039* 0.046 
 (5.504) (0.103) (2.750) (1.979) (4.069) (-0.199) (1.852) (1.066) 
Earnings volatility -5.948*** 7.898*** -5.490*** 7.303*** -3.524** 7.853*** -3.007* 7.163*** 
 (-5.935) (4.586) (-5.531) (4.230) (-2.094) (3.054) (-1.830) (2.728) 
SOA 0.000 0.574* 0.023 0.544* 0.109 0.965* 0.133 0.949* 
 (0.000) (1.861) (0.230) (1.716) (0.623) (1.802) (0.771) (1.703) 
Beta     -0.105*** 0.046 -0.112*** 0.065 
     (-3.148) (0.719) (-3.349) (1.037) 
Share repurchases 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.909) (-1.570) (0.300) (-1.241) (-0.974) (-1.274) (-1.774) (-1.008) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Firms 1,565 1,564 1,565 1,564 765 761 765 761 
Observations 64,182 64,138 64,182 64,138 20,843 20, 538 20,843 20,538 
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Table 4. Deviations from expected trading days between announcements and changes in dividends. 
The sample includes NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11 and distribution code 1232. I exclude 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). “Days” is defined as the difference between: the number of 
trading days between two announcements for the same quarter of two consecutive years (e.g., Q4-2006 and Q4-2007); and the number of 
trading days in a year (252). “Dividend increase” and “Dividend decrease” are dummy variables equal to one if there is an increase or 
decrease by at least 3% in the dividend per share in a certain quarter for a certain firm. “Marg. effects” is the marginal effect for the 
variable “Days”, where “Days” is set equal to its median. “Share repurchases” is the level of share repurchases. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Constant not reported but estimated for all regressions. Robust t-statistics clustered at the firm 
level in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. 
 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1971-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 1993-2014 
 Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
Dividend 
increase 
(>3%) 
Dividend 
decrease 
(<–3%) 
         
Days  -0.004*** 0.011*** -0.004*** 0.011*** -0.005*** 0.009** -0.005*** 0.009** 
 (-4.584) (5.155) (-4.477) (5.062) (-2.948) (2.308) (-2.909) (2.288) 
Marg. Effects -0.0010*** 0.0004*** -0.0010*** 0.0004*** -0.0012** 0.0003** -0.0011** 0.0003** 
         
Firm age -0.001** 0.004** -0.002*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (-2.243) (2.355) (-3.110) (2.884) (-0.624) (1.427) (-1.069) (1.642) 
Profitability  7.594*** -6.695*** 7.393*** -6.384*** 5.533*** -2.926* 5.392*** -2.731 
 (12.780) (-5.770) (12.542) (-5.598) (5.775) (-1.646) (5.689) (-1.577) 
Total Assets(ln) 0.051*** -0.068***   0.072*** -0.070**   
 (6.597) (-3.064)   (6.257) (-2.365)   
Market cap(ln)   0.068*** -0.095***   0.091*** -0.094*** 
   (8.852) (-4.453)   (7.860) (-3.255) 
Tangibility -0.185*** 0.360*** -0.212*** 0.406*** -0.014 0.453*** -0.040 0.488*** 
 (-3.216) (3.369) (-3.659) (3.724) (-0.174) (2.653) (-0.483) (2.831) 
MA/BA 0.081*** 0.040 0.040** 0.109*** 0.090*** 0.047 0.041* 0.102*** 
 (5.270) (1.003) (2.519) (3.076) (4.024) (1.116) (1.836) (2.796) 
Earnings volatility -6.368*** 7.254*** -5.867*** 6.761*** -4.608*** 6.403** -4.027** 5.858** 
 (-5.895) (3.706) (-5.469) (3.461) (-2.580) (2.445) (-2.301) (2.206) 
SOA -0.036 0.558* -0.013 0.531* 0.092 1.135** 0.116 1.126** 
 (-0.352) (1.844) (-0.125) (1.714) (0.510) (2.065) (0.650) (1.979) 
Beta     -0.111*** 0.065 -0.118*** 0.079 
     (-3.227) (0.993) (-3.397) (1.215) 
Share repurchases 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.304) (-1.264) (-0.364) (-1.008) (-1.468) (-0.904) (-2.053) (-0.726) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Firms 1,540 1,539 1,540 1,539 741 736 741 736 
Observations 58,761 58,707 58,761 58,707 19,148 18,880 19,148 18,880 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Figure 1. Number of days between announcements and delayed announcements. 
a)   N1 = T2 – T1   =    N2 = T3 – T2  
T1     T2     T3 
b)     N1 = T2 – T1   >    N2 = T3 – T2 
T1       T2   T3 
Notes: T1, T2 and T3 represent the dates of three dividend announcements, where T3 > T2 > T1. N1 is the number of (calendar or trading) days 
between T2 and T1, and N2 is the number of (calendar or trading) days between T3 and T2. For both a) and b), T3 – T1 (equal to N1 + N2) 
represents the same number of trading days. In a), there is no delay in dividend announcements, and the N1 is the same as N2. In b), the delay in 
the second announcement (which occurs at T2), reduces automatically N2, even if the third announcement occurs at the expected announcement 
date (T3), because N1 is larger but N1 + N2 remains the same. 
